

## Historical change in conditional expressions

著者(英)	Atsuyoshi SAKAKURA
翻訳者(英)	Stephen Wright HORN
校正者(英)	John H. Haig
journal or publication title	Pioneering Linguistic Works in Japan
page range	1-27
year	2022-06
URL	<a href="http://doi.org/10.15084/00003562">http://doi.org/10.15084/00003562</a>

## Historical change in conditional expressions

SAKAKURA Atsuyoshi

1

It is no secret that much of the theorization about Japanese grammar has, up until now, been centered on examining parts of speech, and has treated theorization about syntax as secondary. As a reflection of this fact, consider those attempts to explain diachronic changes in grammar: the so-called histories of grammar. While they are extremely few in number, when we consider what they have managed to accomplish, we see that it is in almost every case centered on the problem of part of speech: diachronic changes in the forms of inflecting suffixes, the survival or demise of such things as postpositions, inflecting verbal auxiliaries, and items belonging to the category of *fukuyōgo* ‘dependent words’<sup>1</sup> and the like. In particular, research on the last of this list of topics has in essence addressed problems covering things far more lexical than grammatical. Thus, it could be reasonably said that historical change in syntax, which is truly a question of the history of grammar, has up to this point been left in a state where there is ample room for intellectual inquiry (excepting where observations have been made about Modern Japanese with regard to the rationalization of expressions<sup>2</sup> and the trend toward analytical expressions).

Even if it could be said that attempts to address historical change in syntax have been undertaken by now, their approach has been for the most part concerned with outward forms. But if we reflect on the real meaning of change in syntax, mere changes in outward form with respect to the concatenation of words is not the ultimate problem. Rather, taking those outward forms as clues, we should be taking as our object of study changes in the underlying principles of syntax, or to go even further, changes in the way of thinking, that ultimately give birth to those forms. For example, interrogative expressions have existed in language in every historical period. But, by looking at what forms of expression the meanings of those questions have assumed at their respective stages of history, we should be able to trace diachronic changes in the way of thinking in questions in Japanese, and that should be a basis for thinking about diachronic

---

<sup>1</sup> [Translator’s note] In Yamada Yoshio’s grammar, the term *fukuyōgo* ‘dependent words’ covers adverbs, conjunctive particles, and interjections.

<sup>2</sup> Sakakura discusses the rationalization of expressions in, for example, Sakakura, Atsuyoshi, 1960, *Bunpōshi ni tsuite: Gimō hyōgen no hensen o ichi-rei to shite, Kokugo to Kokubungaku* 37(10), pp.75--88.

changes in syntax. This is something that is affirmable, even if we take together the following two facts: 1) that what we understand as syntax should be treated not as Yamada Yoshio's so-called *go no un'yō-ron* 'theory of word usage' (theory of derivational morphology, and the character and use of words) but as his *ku-ron* 'phrase theory' (theory of simplex and complex clauses, and dependent clauses), and 2) that in contrast to Jespersen's morphology ---which he conceived of as a transition from outer form (O) to inner meaning (I) --- Jespersen characterized syntax as being the study of concepts (notion) that instead takes the (opposite) direction: from the content (I) --- which we call "meaning"--- to outer form (O).

Of course, all this requires an accurate and detailed description of the facts of the history of the Japanese language, and the faithful interpretation of those facts, and above all we should guard against theory falling into the realm of subjective speculation. Here I take up a problem observable in the diachronic change of conditional expressions and present an analysis as one attempt at the sort of research I proposed above.

## 2

It is often noted that forms that had been *kitei jōken* 'given conditional'<sup>3</sup> expressions in Early Period Japanese, such as *yukeba* 'when (it) goes', 'because (it) goes', came to be used as *katei jōken* 'hypothetical conditional'<sup>4</sup> expressions in Modern Japanese (*yukeba* 'if (it) goes'). Of course, stating the matter in this way is extremely over-simplifying. It is a fact that at some synchronic point in the history of Old Japanese the form *yukeba*,<sup>5</sup> as a given conditional form, existed in opposition to hypothetical conditional expressions of forms such as *yukaba* 'if (it) goes' and *yukitaraba* 'if (it) goes' etc. And it is also a fact that, conversely, at another synchronic point in the history of Modern Japanese (dating roughly from 1600 AD), from among given conditional expressions of such forms as *yuku kara* 'because (it) goes', *yuku no de* 'given that (it)

---

<sup>3</sup> [Translator's note] The term "given" is used here to mean that the state of affairs described in the "condition" is accepted as realized or as true (that is, roughly, "when/because" as opposed to "if"). The term "given conditional" corresponds to what is termed "provisional" in many Western grammars of Japanese. For each of the terms introduced in this paper, the first mention is presented in romanized Japanese together with an English gloss. All subsequent mentions are in English only.

<sup>4</sup> [Translator's note] The term "hypothetical conditional" corresponds to what is termed the "conditional" in many Western grammars of Japanese.

<sup>5</sup> [Translator's note] Regarding the forms *yukeba* and *yukaba*, for verbs with consonant-ending verb stems such as *yuk-u* 'go', the present tense *izenkei* 'realis form' suffix takes the form *-e-* while the *mizenkei* 'irrealis form' suffix takes the form *-a-*. Forms vary depending on the part of speech of the inflecting form, and depending on the class of word in a given part of speech. As over history some predicates shift class, paradigms change, and some of the forms change, an explanation of all the various forms of the realis and irrealis is not provided here for reasons of space.

goes', *yuku fodo ni* 'at the time (it) goes', *yuku ni yotte* 'due to (its) going', *yuku to* 'when (it) goes', *yukeba* 'when/if (it) goes', 'because (it) goes', *yukitareba* 'once (it) goes', etc., the form *yukeba* also existed as a hypothetical conditional expression along with forms such as *ittara* 'if (it) goes', *yuku nara(ba)* 'if (it) goes', and *yukaba* 'if (it) goes'. But these two facts are of a different nature. It should go without saying that for *yukeba* in the first case and *yukeba* in the second case, their respective values are different.

This notwithstanding, when we consider the facts from a diachronic standpoint, it should also be clear that the *yukeba* which is a given conditional form in the first case and the *yukeba* which is a hypothetical conditional form in the second case are not completely unrelated. A consideration of what sort of sequence of events must have transpired to lead to a situation where the former ostensibly shifted to the latter will surely be one clue to explaining diachronic change in conditional expressions.

Conditional expressions are one sort of conjunctive expression, broadly defined. And conjunctive expressions express in a unified way matters stated through two (or more) sentences that stand in a certain relationship. Generally it can be said that from among these conjunctive expressions, with respect to the items known as conditional expressions in particular, a cause-and-effect relationship can be seen to obtain, to a greater or lesser degree, between the two matters so stated.

However, as has already been pointed out by many others, Daizaburō Matsushita not the least among them,<sup>1</sup> within the set of those expressions deemed to be hypothetical conditionals and given conditionals, when examined in detail, further categorizations are possible. Furthermore, I think it can be said that these distinctions are ultimately owed to the degree of strength which the speaker judges to obtain within a cause-and-effect relationship between the two matters in question. In short, those things to which Matsushita's term *gūzen kakutei* 'coincidental confirmative'<sup>6</sup> can be applied are arguably nothing more than two states of affairs obtaining either simultaneously or sequentially, and the cause-and-effect relationship between them is only expressed in the slightest degree, as in these examples.

---

<sup>6</sup> [Translator's note] The first element in this term refers to the relationship between the "condition" and the "conclusion", while the second element refers to the degree to which the state of affairs in the "condition" is accepted as being realized or true. Many of the terms used hereafter are structured in this way.

*Tabi nishite imo ni kwopureba pototogisu wa ga sumu satwo ni ko ywo  
nakiwataru<sup>7</sup>*

‘As I am missing my beloved, myself being away on travel, a lesser cuckoo flies past here crying all the way over to the village where I live.’

(Man’yō 3783)

*Pimugashi no nwo ni kagirwopwi no tatu miyete kapyerimi sureba tukwi  
katabukinu*

‘The shimmering mist on the eastern fields having come into view, when I turn around and look, the moon has sunk low in the sky.’

(Man’yō 48)

In contrast to the above, the cases which Matsushita calls *hitsuzen kakutei* ‘necessary confirmative’ are cases where an expression is made based on a recognition that the state of affairs in the protasis<sup>8</sup> acts as a cause or reason for the realization of the state of affairs in the apodosis<sup>9</sup>, as can be clearly seen in the following examples.

*...samuku si areba asa-pusuma piki-kagapuri*

‘...because it is cold, I pull the linen bedclothes over me...’

(Man’yō 892)

*Kapyeri-kyeru pito kitareri to ipisikaba, potopoto siniki...*

‘When (they) told (me) that someone just returning (to the capital after being forgiven) had arrived here, (I) almost died...’

(Man’yō 3772)

In this way, necessary confirmatives are clearly expressions based on recognitions of causality, but insofar as they are applied particularly to states of affairs that are actually brought about, they are special cases, and it must be said that the cause-and-effect relationship is lacking in generality.

---

<sup>7</sup> [Translator’s note] While the romanization of Contemporary Japanese proper names and terminology in the text uses the Hepburn system, the romanization of examples uses the Frellesvig-Whitman system, and is phonemic. Note that while the phonemic inventory changes depending on the historical period, fine distinctions in pronunciation are not represented. For example, in Late Middle Japanese, phonemes /o/ and /e/ were pronounced with onglides, and phoneme /f/ was likely pronounced widely as [ϕ], etc. These facts are inferable from the so-called Christian Materials, but are not represented in the romanization,

<sup>8</sup> [Translator’s note] The protasis is the clause containing the condition.

<sup>9</sup> [Translator’s note] The apodosis is the clause containing the conclusion.

Here we should ask, what might we consider to be a case where causality itself is expressed directly using the sort of generality we just mentioned, and Matsushita calls just such a thing by the name of *genzen katei* ‘manifest hypothetical’ (or alternatively *jōnen katei* ‘immutable hypothetical’, as he refers to it in his work *Hyōjun Nihon kōgo-hō* [Standard spoken Japanese]).

*Pitati naru Nasaka no umi no tama-mo koso pikeba taye sure*

‘It is the seaweed in the ocean at Nasaka in Hitachi Province which parts when you pull it.’

(Man’yō 3397)

In this example, the action denoted by *piku* (pulling) regularly leads to the result of *tayu* (parting), and as such it can be thought that the relationship between the two states of affairs has transcended the status of an individual fact, and has transcended time, so that it is recognized as having a sort of universality.

As for those items which, as things that share the form [*izenkei* ‘realis form’ + *ba*], have until now been treated equally as expressing given conditionals, it is this outstanding insight of Matsushita’s that has brought me to place such emphasis on the semantic distinctions among their three types mentioned above, and to place particular emphasis on distinguishing the manifest (or immutable) hypothetical. However, I think it was not appropriate for Matsushita to call this last type “manifest hypothetical”, nor was it appropriate to proclaim that “the *kakutei kōsoku-kaku* ‘confirmative restrictive case’<sup>10</sup> (in Matsushita’s framework this denotes expressions corresponding to the *juntai jōken* ‘consequential conditional’) is an extension of the *katei kōsoku-kaku* ‘hypothetical restrictive case’ and not something that reflects the original usage”. The manifest hypothetical is clearly something that should be thought of as having been a type of confirmative expression. Here (in the interests of avoiding confusion in terms hereafter) I will call it the *kōjō kakutei* ‘generic confirmative’.

Now, if we line up these three given conditional expressions on a scale so that their respective degrees of causality gradually increase as we progress from the first to the last, we have the order in which they were originally presented above. With regard

<sup>10</sup> [Translator’s note] In Matsushita’s framework, *kōsoku* ‘restrain’ and *hōnin* ‘release’ are used contrastively to mean, respectively, “consequential” and “concessive”. As consequential conditionals can logically be thought of as placing restrictions on a domain, *kōsoku* is rendered as “restrictive” here. Furthermore, in Matsushita’s framework, syntactic functions of predicates are treated as grammatical cases. Hence the term “confirmative restrictive case” is a conjunctive form that is used for expressing consequential conditionals in which the protasis is understood as being realized or true.

to the recognition of causality of this sort, it is not without merit to consider the matter in light of what we know about stages of language development in children.

For a child at the earliest stage, the characteristics of states of affairs each time they appear and disappear before the eyes of the child are grasped anew in a disconnected way. Naturally, the conditions that obtain in the structure of a given event are not fixed. In “recounts” by the child, the child frequently uses conjunctive elements in order to grasp coincidental and momentary situations as objective continua, but the child cannot establish a relationship between a given event and its preconditions in such a way that the event can be “explained”. Still, gradually the child tries to impose a narrative order to these, and in those cases what is born is what Stern calls *tendō-teki suiri* ‘transduction’, which is inference from individual case to individual case, without passing through a general class of cases. This is of course not a rational mode of thought. Nevertheless, employing this sort of inference one way or another, the child gradually comes to recognize the nature of matters shifting from causes to effects: the fact that effects invariably include their causes. In this way, presented with states of affairs in their raw state in everyday experience, the child eventually learns to abstract those states of affairs (the ingredients of inference) from their concrete contexts, drawing out from things in real existence their respective factors and ordering them in set series, thereby becoming able to form that special series consisting of cause and effect. But in order to do this, first the child must separate the factors from real existence and re-situate them in a categorical dimension. It is not until the development of this sort of categorical thought that recognition of causality becomes possible for the child, and it is said that only when the child becomes an adolescent does this process lead to the concept of principles.<sup>ii</sup>

If we provisionally apply these stages of psychological development to the three levels of conditional expressions introduced immediately above, we can see that the coincidental confirmative corresponds to the extremely early stage of using many conjunctive expressions, the necessary confirmative corresponds at best to the transduction stage, and the generic confirmative corresponds to the stage of recognition of general causality. It is at the last developmental stage that two events are no longer merely “recounted”, but actually come to be “explained”.

3.

The so-called hypothetical conditional expressions exhibit in nearly all respects a situation that is comparable to what I have analyzed above with regard to given conditional expressions. First, we can probably consider the *gūzen katei* ‘coincidental hypothetical’ exemplified below to be the counterpart of the coincidental confirmative:

*Pamabye yori wa ga utiyukaba umibye yori mukape mo konu ka ...*

‘If I go along the shore, won’t (you please) come from the sea to meet me ...?’

(Man’yō 4044)

Indeed, here too, what is related is the inference that two events will probably occur either simultaneously or sequentially at some point in the future. In contrast to this, in the case of what should probably be called the *hitsuzen katei* ‘necessary hypothetical’ (exemplified below), a causal relationship between two events has already been clearly recognized, but it is stated in the form of a presumption or conjecture that the relationship obtains in some future reality:

*Nageki seba pito sirinu bemi ...*

‘Being that if I sigh, strangers will become aware ...’

(Man’yō 1383)

*Nakanaka ni sinaba yasukyemu. Kimi ga me wo mizu pisa naraba, subye nakaru besi.*

‘It will be easier if I just die. If it is a very long time without seeing you, there is not about to be any recourse.’

(Man’yō 3934)

Accordingly, in these two examples, in each statement of protasis and apodosis, both have the nature of inferences about states of affairs that have yet to be come about, and each pairing takes a form in which a so-called “time agreement”<sup>11</sup> can be observed.<sup>iii</sup> And finally as the third case, we can conceive of a *kōjō katei* ‘generic hypothetical’ corresponding to the generic confirmative:

---

<sup>11</sup> [Translator’s note] The term *toki no koō* ‘time agreement’ originally was used to refer to semantic agreement between temporal adverbs and the tenses of the predicates they modify. Here this term is used in an extended sense to refer to the semantic agreement of the [irrealis + *ba*] form in the subordinate clauses with the conjectural meaning of the modality elements *mu* ‘shall’ and *besi* ‘ought’ at the ends of the main clauses.

*Ame tuti no kamwi wo kopitutu are matamu. Paya kimase, kimi. Mataba kurusi mo.*

‘Praying to the gods of heaven and earth, I shall wait. Please come quickly, my lord. If I were to wait, how painful it would be!’

(Man’yō 3682)

*... midaruru kokoro koto ni idete ipaba yuyusimi.*

‘...if I were to say, putting into words, (the thoughts of) my troubled heart, it would be unlucky.’

(Man’yō 4008)

Similar to what is seen in the generic confirmative, these are expressions which posit the causality in a given state of affairs as a general principle transcending time and spanning over factualities.

With regard to the origins of forms that express hypothetical conditionals, such as *sakaba* ‘if (it) blooms’, Susumu Ohno<sup>iv</sup> posits the following process of change: **sak-am-fa** → **sakamfa** → **sakamba** → **saka<sup>m</sup>ba** → **sakaba**, where the **am** which appears in the process is probably the auxiliary verb of conjecture. But even if the truth of the matter was not precisely along these lines, still it is not hard to imagine that the *ba* that is employed in this form has the same nature as that of the *kakari joshi* ‘focus particle’ *pa* (TOPIC), and that in the part of the word preceding this there is included the meaning of an as yet unrealized state of affairs. In the stages of the coincidental hypothetical and the necessary hypothetical, the *chinjutsu* ‘predicative force’ of the inflecting word was accompanied by *ba*, and was in agreement with the predicative force at the end of the sentence, but when it comes to the generic hypothetical, the irrealis form, as a whole, functions as something which takes on the nature of a noun (with respect to which, the fact that there were instances in which the irrealis form was used together with the particle *ni* in an adverbial function should be taken into account)<sup>12</sup>. For example, it is imaginable that the expression *ipaba yuyusimi* ‘if (I) were to say... it would be unlucky’ quoted above is something which takes the state of affairs described in the protasis and expresses it nominally as a fact with the conjectural meaning included within it: *ipan (koto) pa yuyushimi* ‘(the case such) that I should say [it] would be unlucky’. Matsushita calls the first two examples above *kanryō-sei*<sup>13</sup>

<sup>12</sup> This appears to be a reference to Old Japanese expressions such as *sira-ni* ‘not knowing that/of’.

<sup>13</sup> [Translator’s note] The term *kanryō* is often used to indicate perfective aspect, but in the context of this paper the terms *kanryō-sei* and *hikanryō-sei* are used to indicate, respectively, whether the

*mizen katei* ‘factual irrealis hypotheticals’, and in contrast, to the second two examples that follow those he gives the name *hikanryō-sei mizen katei* ‘non-factual irrealis hypotheticals’.

Incidentally, with regard to those expressions which we are to understand by the name of “generic hypothetical”, expressions which we can deem without reserve to be examples of that category actually do not appear to be found in much abundance in Old Japanese. The exceptions are cases that hypothesize about counterfactuals in the (subjunctive) form ... *seba* ...*masi* ‘if *X* were to ..., then *Y* would ...’, and those that employ adjectives to ascribe time-transcending properties, such as the immediately preceding examples and others like *okure wite kwopwiba kurusi mo* ‘If, being left behind, I were to long for you, how painful that would be’ (Man’yō 3568). At the very least, in contrast to the existence of the form [inflecting word + *taraba* ‘if (it) is’] for expressing the factual irrealis hypothetical, there as yet existed no form solely dedicated to expressing the generic hypothetical (that is, no form such as, for example, the construction [inflecting word + *naraba* ‘if (it) is’] discussed below).

Furthermore, there is an observation to be made with regard to generic hypothetical expressions such as *okure wite kwopwiba kurusi mo* ‘If, being left behind, I were to long for you, how painful that would be’ or such as *koto ni idete ipaba yuyusimi*. ‘...if I were to say, putting into words, ... it would be unlucky ...’ discussed above, or such as the following example:

*Utipi sasu miya ni yuku kwo wo ma-ganasimi, tomureba kurusi. Yareba subye nasi.*

‘Because this child who goes to serve the palace is so precious to me, if I were to keep her here, it would be painful. If I were to send her off, there would be no remedy.’

(Man’yō 532)

To wit, it would probably be possible to express them using the generic confirmative as in *kwopureba kurusi* ‘because/when I long for you, it will be painful’ and *ipeba yuyusimi* ‘because/when I say... it will be unlucky’. Rather than concerning the

---

expression as a whole is conceived of as an (isolated) factual eventuality or not. To the extent that things like the optative mood and modal elements of volition or conjecture, etc. in the apodosis are considered to lend conditional expressions *hikanryō-sei*, that term is rendered as “non-factual”. Note that the opposition does not perfectly correspond to that between indicative conditionals and counterfactual conditionals in Western semantics and philosophy of language. In Sakakura’s framework the opposition is sometimes described as that between the concrete and the abstract.

occurrence of one state of affairs at a particular time, both of these express the existence of a universal causality in a state of affairs, and in order to establish the existence in the future of a relationship that has this sort of generality, of course in the background there must be some recognition yielded from an accumulation of states of affairs that have already existed, and so it is only natural to conceive of this sort of correlation between these two types of conditionals.<sup>v</sup> In this respect, the very first problem presented here, namely the displacement that occurs between the given conditional and the hypothetical conditional, already had its origins at this early stage.

Nevertheless, the problem is how to understand the fact that the form of expression of the generic confirmative gradually gained strength, until in Modern Japanese it finally encroached to some extent upon the domain of the factual irrealis hypothetical expressions.

Generic hypothetical expressions gradually increase in number in the Heian period and continue through the Kamakura period (although arguably this depends on the nature of the source texts in some ways). The remarkable thing in spoken text sources from the Muromachi period is the generalization of the form [inflecting predicate + *naraba* ‘if (it) is’]. This is used in opposition with the form [inflecting predicate + *taraba* ‘as (it) is’] which exhibits the factual nature of supposing the occurrence of some state of affairs in reality. In contrast to this, consider the expressions *to naraba*, *mono naraba*, and *fodo naraba* in the examples below.

*Kono kuni ni umarenuru to naraba, nagekase-tatematsuranu podo made  
(paberu beki ni) paberade...*

‘If it is a case where I was born on this world, then for as long a time as would not make you grieve (I would have stayed), but my not staying ....’

(Takatori monogatari)

*Mosi kono koto morenuru mono naraba tyuuseraremu koto utagai nasi.*

‘If it is a case where this matter is divulged, (I, Yukitsuna) would be killed without a doubt.’

(Rufubon Heike monogatari, Saikō ga kirare)

*Masasyuu iituru fodo naraba yagate tenzyō made mo kiri-noboranzuru mono  
no tura-damasi...*

‘(Iesada was) a man of a fierce disposition such that, if it was an event in which (Tadamori) had spoken truthfully, straightaway (Iesada) would have entered the Courtiers’ Hall, slashing, ’

(Rufubon Heike monogatari, Tenjō yami-uchi )

While the complex expressions *to naraba*, *mono naraba*, and *fodo naraba* are used to express instances of the generic hypothetical protasis as above, a different form can derive the same effect. By employing a simplex inflecting predicate, a state of affairs described thereby can be summed up as a single eventuality, without necessarily making an issue for now of whether it happens or not in actuality, and its existence can be supposed, expressing a generic hypothetical protasis as in the example below (in fact, in the Amakusabon version of the Heike monogatari, the sentence corresponding to the third example directly above is rendered as *iu naraba tenzyō made mo kiri-noborisō na mono no tura-damasi* ‘[Iesada] was a person of such fierce disposition that if (Tadamori) had said (it), (Iesada) would likely have entered the Courtier’s Hall slashing’). This is truly an appropriate form for a generic hypothetical expression:

*Ka no niwatori sae nai naraba kore fodo fukyō ni wa okosaremazii mono.*  
‘If only that rooster were gone, we wouldn’t be woken up so early in the morning’

(Amakusabon Isopo monogatari)

In this example, the inflecting predicate is used in isolation. In this way, such expressions, just as they are, come to be used for forming *kanryō-sei kōjō katei* ‘factual generic hypothetical’ expressions. For example, consider the following line from the Nobutsura Gassen chapter of the Heike monogatari:

*Ware sinaba kono fue oba mikwan ni ireyo.*  
‘If I (Takakura no Miya) die, put this flute in my coffin.’

The corresponding line in the Amakusabon is rendered in spoken Japanese as follows:

*Wa ga sinda naraba kono fuye o kamaete mikwan ni irei.*  
‘If I (Takakura no Miya) die, put this flute in my coffin.’

Furthermore, an observation can be made about expressions such as the following:

*Soregasi ga inoti o tasukeraruru naraba, ka no roba o onmi no te no wa ni  
mawaru ㄩㄨㄨ ni itasㄩㄩㄩuru.*

‘If you spare my life, I will make it so that that ass will wind up in your hands.’

(Amakusabon Isopo monogatari)

To wit, these are fast approaching the same semantic value as the necessary  
hypotheticals that take the form [inflecting predicate + *taraba*]:

*Nanisama sakana o etaraba sake ni kaete noman to omoedo...*

‘Whatever the case, though you may think that, when you catch a fish you will  
change it for wine and drink it...’

(Chūka jakuboku shishō)

4.

At the point when the construction [inflecting predicate + *naraba*] which originally expressed the generic hypothetical came to take on a tendency toward being a necessary hypothetical expression, the expression that inherited its function was a form (as noted above) closely related to it from the beginning: the generic confirmative expression. Considering the class of confirmative expressions, in the first place, distinguishing between the necessary confirmative and the generic confirmative, both of which were originally expressed by the form [inflecting predicate (realis form) + *ba*], when the history progresses to this stage, a variety of forms are created to cover the former in particular. Along with the form [inflecting predicate + *taraba*] and the form [inflecting predicate + *taru ni*] from the Heian period, there were, for example, *fodo ni*, *sakai ni*, *ni yotte*, *aida ni*, *tokoro de*, etc., adding up to no small number of forms. Accordingly, it is conceivable that the form [inflecting predicate (realis form) + *ba*], which originally expressed the meaning of both the necessary confirmative and the generic confirmative, gradually saw its character of expressing the latter of the two strengthen, and furthermore, from the fact that it was of indefinite tense, it became a form that was more suited to the expression of the semantics of the generic hypothetical than was the form [inflecting predicate + *naraba*] (which was in the process of becoming indistinguishable from the necessary hypothetical).

Of course, it will not do to think that this sort of “displacement” of constructions was complete at this historical stage. This is apparent from the examples below.

...*masa ni kono darani wo zyuzi su besi. Nani yue ni (nani wo motite no yue) to naraba, sunawati darani pa kore no ka-gen-mirai no sho-butsumo no pawana naru wo motite.*

‘One truly ought to learn this prayer. If it is a question of on what grounds, in short it is the grounds that this prayer is the true mother of the various Buddhas of the past, present and future.’

(Konkōmyōsaishōkyō koten)

Corresponding to the expression *nani yue ni to naraba* ‘if it is (to say) on what grounds’ (or alternatively<sup>14</sup> *yue wa ika ni to naraba* ‘if it is [to say] what the grounds are’), in this historical period the following sort of expression was used:

*Rei no sin ga Ei no sin o semeta zo. Naze ni oru zo to iwaba Ei kara atauru koto ga aru fodo ni zo.*

‘The subjects of Li criticized the subjects of Wei: It is because, if the Wei ask them, "Why are you still here?" there are supposed to be things that the Wei proffer.’

(Mōshi-shō)

However, expressions of a form identical to the generic hypothetical are attested in the same text as expressions taking the generic confirmative form:

*Naze ni to ieba oositu --- oo no maturigoto ga fanafadasyuute mooka no moete kuru yō na zo.*

‘If one is to say why, it is because the royal court ... the king’s administration being extremely trying, it was as though a violent flame came burning.’

(Mōshi-shō)

*Naze ni kono fen o owari ni oku zo nareba, kwansyo no uteba hibiku yō ni tukutta zo.*

‘If it is (a question of) why (he) puts this verse at the end, it is because (he) made (the thing) so that the *Kwansho* (verse at the beginning) would have a resonating effect’

(Mōshi-shō)

<sup>14</sup> [Translator’s note] There are alternative translations of the *kanbun* phrase 所以者何.

What is more, factual irrealis hypothetical expressions formed by the [irrealis form + *ba* (*ha*)] construction and necessary confirmative expressions that are formed by the [realis form + *ba*] construction persist not merely until the beginning of the Early Modern era (*circa* 1600):

*Tadasi wagoze mi o nageba imooto no Ginyo o tomo ni mi o nagyoo to iu.*

‘But if you throw yourself (to your death), your younger sister Ginyo says she will throw (to her death) herself as well.’

(Amakusabon Heike monogatari)

*...to susumuredomo syotyoo wa kaette azakereba, tubame no iu wa ...*

‘...and because, even though (the swallow) urged (them to do so), the many birds scorned (him), the swallow said, ...’

(Amakusabon Heiki monogatari)

In fact, they continued to be used as forms of spoken language even until the end of the Early Modern period:

*Yo ga yo naraba sa. No. Yosi ka. Zen'eimon nanzaa, ore, ore ga uchi e isooroo ni oite yaru no da. Honnyo yotte iu zya nee keredo, honnyo yo ga yo naraba koso ore ga ite yaru no da.*

‘You know, if this world were as it should be ---Hey, are you listening?--- It would be me letting the likes of Zen'eimon squat in my house. Actually ---I'm not saying it because I'm drunk, but--- actually, since this world is the way it is, it's me doing him a favor by squatting.’

(Ukiyodoko)

Passages such as the one immediately above should be taken as examples of the distinction in question.<sup>vi</sup> However, the fact that the greater part of these are used in connection with either the verbs *ari* ‘exist’ and *nari* ‘be’, or with adjectives, or with negative auxiliary verbs (all forms that express a stative meaning) would lead one to think that there is a supposition of some degree of generic causality operating here. Nevertheless, our interests in the history of the Japanese language remain focused on the fact that the construction [realis form + *ba*] that originally was a form used for the

generic confirmative started being used where the meaning of the generic hypothetical was supposed to be expressed.

On top of this, another thing that deserves more attention is the fact that, if one traces the progression of the construction [inflecting predicate + *naraba*] in its transition from the generic hypothetical to the factual irrealis hypothetical, it is apparent that in all likelihood the [realis form + *ba*] form gradually also came to be used to express a meaning close to that of the factual irrealis hypothetical. A development can be seen starting from examples like the one below.

*Ka no Kiyomori no goikke no fitobito to sae ieba, kuge, buke tomo ni omote o mukae kata o naraburu fito mo gozanakatta.*

‘If one merely said, “These are people from the honorable family of the reknowned Kiyomori,” then there was not a single person among all the courtiers and warriors together who could face them square on or line up shoulder to shoulder with them.’

(Amakusabon Heike monogatari)

And that development can be further observed in the way this form was even used to express hypotheticals, as can be seen in the examples below:

*Sizen mo fito ni yuki-aeba wara akuta no naka ni nige-itte kakururu ni mo kokoro-yasui.*

‘If **by chance** we come across a human, running away into the straw or the rubbish and hiding is easy.’

(Amakusabon Isopo monogatari)

*Sore ni yotte **mosi** Feike no koto o asii sama ni mōsu mono ga areba, iti-nin kiki-idasanu fodo koso are, sanbyaku-nin no mono no uti tare nari tomo kore o sukosi kikeba, yakate fōbai ni fure-meguraite...*

‘Because of this, if **perchance** there was anyone who spoke ill of the Heike, no sooner than one member heard it, whosoever of those three hundred members (he) might be, once (he) heard even a bit of that, (he) straight away notified his fellows...’

(Amakusabon Heiki monogatari)

*Mosi Yorimasa dya wa Mitumoto nado to mōsu Genzi-domo ni  
azamukaretareba koso makoto ni itimon no tizyoku de mo gozarōzure.*

‘If **perchance** one was made a fool of by a Genji such as the ones named  
Yorimasa or Mitsumoto, that **would surely be** an insult to the entire family.’

(Amakusabon Heike monogatari)

In addition, we can view these facts in light of the existence of concessive conditional expressions:

*Ikana oozei kuredomo, tate iti-zyoo de kamayuru. Mata oozei de semuru tomo  
siro ni komotte oru zo.*

‘**No matter** in what great numbers they come, (he) confronts them with a single  
shield. Furthermore, even if they were to attack in great numbers, (he) is taking  
cover in the castle.’

(Mōshi-shō)

*Tatoi onna no sode o fiku to omou mono ga aredomo onna ga tadasii fodo ni iya  
to iite naranu zo.*

‘**Even if there is** someone who would think to pull on the woman’s sleeve, as the  
woman is virtuous, saying, “No!”, it will not bear results.’

(Mōshi-shō)

As might be expected, with regard to these concessive forms *-do* and *-domo*, just as with the consequential form *-ba*, they can be divided into three types: coincidental confirmative (ex. *Turu no asi pa nagakeredomo kamo no asi pa mizikasi* ‘While the legs of the egret are long, the legs of the duck are short’); necessary confirmative (ex. *Pito no oya no kokoro pa yami ni aranedomo ko o omou miti ni mayoinuru ka na* ‘While the hearts of parents are not in darkness, how completely do parents lose their way when they consider their children!’); and generic confirmative (ex. *Matsu no fa o kuu fito fa gokoku o kuwanedomo kurusimi nasi* ‘People who eat pine needles feel no pain even though they don’t eat any of the five grains’). This is just as is claimed by Matsushita. It is possible to see these as coming from examples like the one below in which the generic confirmative meaning is found:

*Ika ni iyasii mono naredomo toki to site wa kizin kōke no tasuke to naru koto mo aru mono dya.*

‘No matter how low of status people are, sometimes there are occasions when they are of assistance to the high-born and members of respected households.’

(Amakusabon Isopo monogatari)

In particular the first example has a parallel construction in which the first member is confirmative, while in the second member a hypothetical expression is used, and consideration of the fact that the two are treated as having equal value should suffice to make the point. (However, in the *Kyōdai toshokan kura nijū kan hon* ‘Kyoto University Library repository twenty volume book’, the line is *oozei de semuredomo* ‘though they come in great numbers’, which is interesting in itself.)

Even though items that had taken the form of generic confirmative expressions began to be applied to factual irrealis hypothetical expressions, of course, to some extent there remain therein nuances of the generic confirmative (or alternatively the generic hypothetical) meanings. This is true even if we set aside set expressions such as the following: ...*sureba suru hodo* ‘the more (X does) Y, the more...’; ...*mo sureba, ...mo suru* ‘if W does X, then Y also does Z’; ...*to ieba* ‘when it comes to X’(presentational); *hayaku ieba* ‘long story short’, ...*o ieba* ‘speaking of X’; *shite mireba* ‘from the standpoint (of)’; ...*-reba tote* ‘even if’. This is observable not only in Late Edo period examples like the following:

*Are de aikyoo ga ariyaa oni ni kanaboo sa.*

‘Given all that, if she has charm, it’s an unbeatable combination.’

(Ukiyoburo)

*A I U E WO no ue e, mu no zi ga noreba, goinsootsuu de, onnai, kwannon, ennin, zennaku nado to iu mono da to ....*

‘According to the principle of vowel alternation, if the character “mu” appears above any of “a, i, u, e, o”, they are pronounced as in *onnai, kwannon, ennin, zennaku*, etc.

(Ukiyoburo)

*Sinda ki ni natte ireba, nani mo yakamasii hazu wa nai.*

‘If you pretend that you have died, nothing should bother you.’

(Ukiyoburo)

*Koko ni tuite oide nasariyaa ii ga, yu no ato e o-kyaku ga kuriyaa matasitya oke ya sen.*

‘It’s all right if you go now that you’ve arrived here, but if a customer comes after (you’ve gone to) your bath, I can’t let him wait.’

(Ukiyodoko)

*Hito no sindai no yoku naru no wa hookoonin sae yokereba sumiyaka da.*

‘For person’s assets to improve, if only their employees are good, then it goes quickly.’

(Ukiyodoko)

It is also observable in Contemporary Japanese. If we provisionally sample just a few examples from Iwabuchi Etsutarō’s *Kotoba no gendai fūkei* ‘Contemporary scenes in Japanese’, we can see that such expressions carry a generic hypothetical meaning that differs from other conditionals such as the set expression ...*sureba ii* ‘(one) should do X’ first and foremost, but also including ....*tara* ‘if, when’ and ...*nara* ‘if, given that’.

*Zidoosya ni hikarereba ti ga deru mon.*

‘If one gets hit by a car, one bleeds (as a matter of course).’

*Anta koppu mittu moraeba ii wa.*

‘You are supposed to receive three cups.’

*Aka-tyan totte kureba ii zya nai.*

‘Isn’t it better if (you) bring the baby?’

(Scenes from nursery school)

*Hazime kara dansi kookoo ni sityaeba ii n da ne.*

‘So it’s better if you choose an all-boys’ high school from the very start, don’t you think?’

*Tikoku sitatte korareru mon, koyoo to omoeba.*

‘Even though you may be late, you can come, if you’re of a mind to come.’

*Teinen ni nareba kubi ni naru n da.*

‘It’s a case where if you reach retirement age you get laid off.’

(Kōkō jidai)

*N dakara kikeba wakarū, kikeba.*

‘So, if you listen you will understand, if you just listen.’

*Kite kurereba ii no ni naa.*

‘In spite of the fact that if (they) come (as we wish) it would be good!’

*Kimi ga orannya wakaran zya nai ka.*

‘If you aren’t here, how are you supposed to understand?’

(Kokkai hikae-shitsu)

Accordingly, the formulation to the effect that “expressions of the given conditional form in Old Japanese came to express hypothetical conditionals in Modern Japanese” needs to be qualified to a finer degree. However, Contemporary Japanese expressions of hypothetical conditionals are covered under three forms: *tara*, *nara(ba)*, and [hypothetical form + *ba*]<sup>15</sup>. Furthermore, the fact that this trend is something that began to be notable at the end of the Muromachi period where Modern Japanese marks its starting point should be a point of deep interest.

To put the matter more specifically, to begin with, in contrast to a hypothetical conditional expression in Old Japanese, which presents the fact of an actual occurrence as the protasis and makes a separate inference drawn from that fact, judging by the way that a corresponding expression in Modern Japanese presents a fact in the protasis in a form including the verb *ari* ‘exist’,<sup>16</sup> which includes the meaning of existence, it is possible to see that the hypothetical conditional expression itself came to take on a generic hypothetical character. In the first place, as noted above, the fact that in the Middle Ages the construction [inflecting predicate + *naraba*] that originally expressed the generic hypothetical meaning began to be used for factual irrealis hypotheticals is nothing less than a reflection of this point. And furthermore, this trend is made even clearer by the fact that what had been a generic confirmative form of expression was relegated to the hypothetical conditional. In short, this means that hypothetical conditional expressions in Modern Japanese actually came to take a form reflecting a

<sup>15</sup> [Translator’s note] What is called the *katei-kei* ‘hypothetical form’ in grammars of Contemporary Japanese is a suffix on verb stems of the generalized form *-(er)e-*. For example, for verbs with consonant-final stems, the form is *-e-*. For the verb *yuk-u* ‘go’, the hypothetical form is seen in the words *yukeba* ‘if (it) goes’ and *yukedo* ‘although (it) goes’. As the hypothetical form functions in a paradigm of oppositions distinct from older paradigms in which the *izenkei* ‘realis form’ functioned, the two forms should not be confused.

<sup>16</sup> This references the fact that *naraba* is a contraction of [*ni* (COPULA) + *ari* (irrealis) ‘exist’ + *ba*] and *tara* is historically derived from [*to* (COMPLEMENTIZER) + *ari* ‘exist’].

way of thinking that predicts there to be causality with a constant generality in the background of the matter at hand. To put it metaphorically, though they belong to the selfsame category of generic conditional expressions, in addition to the explanative attitude of *yue wa ika ni to naraba* ‘if it comes to how the reason is’ and *naze ni to iwaba* ‘if one were to say why’, there remains in the inference the same uncertainty that is found when a separate reason is provided in the form ...*ga yue naran* ‘X must be the reason’, but in the expressions *naze ... zo nareba* ‘when it comes to why X is the case’ and *naze ni to ieba* ‘when one says why’, there is the back-up support of a generality together with a certainty in the inference such as might be provided by stating ...*ga yue nari* ‘X is the reason’.

If the Contemporary Japanese *tara* ‘if, when’ can indeed be thought to be derived from a process with stages *tareba* < *taryaa* < *tara*, the same situation can be thought to obtain here as well.<sup>vii</sup>

## 5

One thing that presents itself as a problem when we consider it in light of expressions that take forms particular to concepts that are generic and have universality in their background is the question of the so-called *gyakusetsu jōken* ‘concessive conditional’ expressions.

In order for a given expression to be interpreted as a concessive conditional expression, there must be a fact having general causality (what one might call a generally accepted notion) present in the background context. The reason why one interprets the following example as a concessive conditional expression is because we understand it based on the generally accepted notion that “children normally cry when they are set down from someone’s arms”.

*Idaki-orosarete, naki nado pa si-tamawazu.*

‘(She) didn’t even cry, (in spite of) having been set down from (her caregiver’s) arms’

(Genji monotagari, Usugumo)

It should be possible to see a characteristic peculiar to the Japanese language of more remote historical periods from the observation that, even while two states of affairs are identifiable as being in a concessive relationship on the basis of semantics, with regard to form, the expression consists of a simple conjunctive relation. The question of whether there is a meaning that is especially concessive inherent in certain

conjunctive particles is doubtful: This goes without saying for (conjunctive particle) *ga* ‘although’, which used to be a case particle, and applies as well to both the *ni* and the *wo* which are said to be conjunctive particles.<sup>17</sup>

Nevertheless, this situation gave birth to a construction employing the word *mono* ‘thing’, which clearly indicates that an expression is a concessive conditional expression. For example, as Saeki<sup>viii</sup> has said, if one substitutes the word *pito* ‘person’ in the example below with the form *mono* to make the expression *owasimasu mono no*, this clearly expresses a concessive condition.<sup>18</sup>

*Teiwau no kami naki kurawi ni nobori-tamau beki sau owasimasu pito no,  
sonata nite mireba midare-ureuru koto ya aramu.*

‘(He) being a person with the fate of deserving to rise to a position to which none is superior, that of the Emperor, if I tell (his) fortune as such a one, will there not be chaos and resentment?’

(Genji monotagari, Kiritsubo)

Consider the expression *ara-nu ga* (exist-NEG NOM) in the well-known opening passage below:

*Ito yan-goto naki kiwa ni pa aranu ga, sugurete tokimeki-tamau arikeri.*

‘There once was (a person) not in circumstances of great privilege who received especial favor.’

(Genji monotagari, Kiritsubo)

(The reason why the expression takes particle *ga* is that the word *ara-nu* [exist-NEG] that precedes *ga* is a nominalized predicate, roughly equivalent to a noun.) If we interpolate *pito no* (person GEN) there, and subsequently substitute that with *mono no* (thing GEN), this unequivocally expresses a concessive condition.<sup>19</sup> In short, the function of the formal noun *mono* ‘thing’ in this case is, after all, to lay down the

<sup>17</sup> [Translator’s note] Conjunctive particle *ga* ‘although, but’ is said to have originated from the nominative case particle *ga*; conjunctive particle *ni* ‘notwithstanding’ is said to have originated from the locative case particle *ni*; conjunction particle *wo* ‘notwithstanding’ is said to have originated from the accusative case particle *wo*.

<sup>18</sup> [Translator’s note] The gloss for the example would accordingly change to ‘In spite of the fact that (he) has the fate of deserving to rise to a position to which none is superior, that of the Emperor, if I tell (his) fortune as such a one, will there not be chaos and resentment?’

<sup>19</sup> [Translator’s note] The gloss for the example would accordingly change to ‘There once was a person who, in spite of not being in circumstances of great privilege, received especial favor.’

groundwork for stating a fact with universal causality, and it does this by assembling the contents of the preceding predication into one abstract noun, in just the same way as *mono naraba* in its use in generic hypothetical expressions. If this is the case, then, for example, by expressing part of the preceding example in the form *yangoto naki kiwa ni aranu mono* (or alternatively, *koto* ‘matter’) ‘a person (or matter) not in circumstances of great privilege’, one can cause the reader to anticipate a generally accepted notion to the effect that “therefore this is a person (or matter) such that should be no expectation of receiving especial favors”, and given this, by stating that this was “a person (or matter) that occasioned especial favors”, a concessive meaning is generated.

The expression *mono no* born of this sort of process eventually comes to take on the function of a conjunctive particle in its own right, but the same sort of principle ought to be recognizable in the circumstances surrounding expressions such as *mono kara* ‘because’, *mono yue* ‘for the reason that’, *mono wo* ‘given that, in spite of’, *mono ka* ‘perhaps because’. By the end of the Middle Ages, the expression *mono wo* had already progressed from being a conjunctive particle to even taking on the character of an interjectional element (Rodriguez, *Nihon daibunten* [Arte da Lingoa de Iapam]). As noted earlier, expressions which are given a concessive meaning by the inclusion of *kara*, *yue*, *wo*, *ka* and the like had existed in Japanese from its earliest historical periods. But in the span of time from Early Period Japanese to that of the Middle Ages, we can discern the trend toward expressions that take a form embodying the concept of background generalization by observing the way that forms expressing clear meanings of concessive conjunction owing to the addition of the formal noun *mono* came to be established. And in the constructions *...ta tokoro ga*, *...ta tokoro de*, *...ta tokoro wo* that were employed so frequently in Early Modern Japanese, here too the form *ta* expresses not the meaning that the action or state has already happened (which would be consequential in meaning), but rather expresses a perfective meaning in which the denotation of the verb is expressed as a fact having genericity, and this gives rise to the meaning of a concessive conjunction.

Now, this sort of trend is, of course, a fact that is relevant to the “rationalization of expressions in Modern Japanese” pointed out earlier. As stated previously, recognizing causality between two states of affairs makes an expression no longer merely a “recounting” but an “explaining”. At the level of the coincidental confirmative and the coincidental hypothetical, their expression is close to being the serial concatenation of two clauses, where in the protasis there is a predicative force containing, for all practical purposes, a coordinative conjunction (for example, *opoyuki no midarete kitare* ‘because (arrows) came flying wildly like a great snow’ [Manyō

199]). For the purpose of unifying a sentence, the predicative force in the protasis must agree with the predicative force in the apodosis and the two together must be integrated by the larger predicative force of the sentence as a whole. In necessary hypothetical expressions, the relationship is similar. That is why the so-called “phenomenon of ‘time agreement’ in conditional expressions” is observable.

Still, in the stages spanning from the necessary confirmative through the generic hypothetical and the generic confirmative, the predicative force of condition in the protasis is absorbed into the predicative force of the apodosis, and it is the predicative force at the end of the sentence that eventually determines the statement of the sentence as a whole. To illustrate, consider the example below:

*Parupana no uturopu made ni apimineba tukwi pi yomitutu imo matu ramu zo.*  
 ‘Surely it must be that, as we haven’t met one another even up until the scattering of the spring flowers, my beloved is waiting, counting the days and months.

(Man’yō 3982)

While this goes without saying for normal generic confirmative expressions, given the sort of generic confirmative expression seen in the above example, it is possible to interpret it in the following structure:<sup>ix</sup>

<u>apimineba imo matu</u>	<u>ramu</u>
‘because we haven’t met my beloved waits’	‘surely it must be’

That we judge the lack of “time agreement”<sup>20</sup> here<sup>x</sup> to be acceptable in the way we do most likely is because the speaker expresses conjecturally the very fact in which the causality of apimineba imo matu ‘because we haven’t met my beloved waits’ obtains.

It is necessary to connect facts of this sort with the rationalization of expressions, at least in the present case. Specifically, at the point when the forms of generic confirmative expressions that originally had this character began to be used for hypothetical conditional expressions, it amounted to the establishment of one rationalization of expression in Modern Japanese. And if we express this in terms of morphology, there was a process by which the particle *ba*, which is thought to originally have had the nature of a focus particle and which contributed to the predicative force of


<sup>20</sup> [Translator’s note] The subordinate clause ending in [realis + *ba*] can be thought of as failing to agree with the conjectural modality of *ramu* ‘surely must’.

the protasis, gradually came to carry logical predicative force, such that “it could be said that it is in essence a kind of case particle”.<sup>xi</sup> In short, the situation described above arguably parallels a phenomenon in which expressions formed by *kakari musubi* ‘focus agreement’ go extinct in Modern Japanese. For example, in interrogative sentences such as *hana ka saku* ‘Is it flowers that bloom?’ and *hana ya saku* ‘Is it flowers that bloom?--- Surely not’ in more ancient stages of the Japanese language, the predication is divided into two parts. But when the language develops to the point where Modern Japanese has the expression as *hana saku ka* ‘Do flowers bloom?’ the sentence is unified by the interrogative predication at the end of the sentence, and this is exactly the same sort of situation.<sup>xii</sup>

Incidentally, it is particularly the case of the *juntai jōken hyōgen* ‘consequential conditional expressions’ wherein one sees this sort of situation by which “the conditional case is subsumed under inflections of predicates”,<sup>xiii</sup> whereas for the *gyakusetsu jōken hyōgen* ‘concessive conditional expressions’, there is a greater opposition between the protasis and apodosis as compared with the consequential forms. In the case of the concessive expressions, the protasis is of a form close to the so-called *chūshi-hō* ‘infinitive conjunction’. This is also evident morphologically: The *kakari joshi* ‘focus particles’ *koso*, *zo*, *namu*, *ya*, and *ka* are able to attach to the consequential conjunctive particle *ba*. (In short, that the very conditional phrase introduced by *ba* can be additionally governed by focus particles clearly demonstrates the character of *ba* discussed earlier). In contrast, those same focus particles are unable to attach to the concessive forms *domo*, *ga*, *ni*, *wo*, *tomo*, and the same situation can be said to apply to the infinitive conjunction forms, so the general point is verifiable by reference to this morphological fact. That the concessive conjunctions are infinitive-like in nature is, as stated earlier, easily understood in light of the fact that they are forms that precede other predications with the overt description of logical causality omitted. Furthermore, the concessive coincidental confirmative and the consequential coincidental confirmative are extremely close to one another, and in light of this, it is a fact of deep interest that, as Matsuo noted, the following poem in the Ogura shikishi is widely transmitted with *nagamureba* ‘when/because (I) gaze’.

*Sabisisa ni yado o tati-idete nagamuredo iduku mo onazi aki no yuugure*  
 ‘Stepping out of my home out of loneliness, though I gaze about, everywhere is  
 the same. Autumn dusk’

Postscript: If one organizes this paper’s descriptions by historical period as they apply to forms of expression for (consequential) conditionals in the case of the verb *yuku* ‘go’, it will look very much like the figure below:



<sup>i</sup> Matsushita, Daizaburō, *Kaisen hyōjun Nihongo bunpō* [Revised Standard Japanese Grammar]; Yuzawa, Kōkichirō, Setsuzoku joshi ‘ba’ no yōhō [Usage of the conjunctive particle ‘ba’], *Kokugo Kaishaku* inaugural volume; Kinoshita, Masao, Katei jōken-hō ni tsuite [On the use of the hypothetical conditional], *Kokugo Kokubun*, May, 1943; Kinoshita, Masatoshi, Jōken-hō ni okeru katei/kakutei no koō no sonpi to sore ni kansuru Man’yōshū no kunko shiken [Observations on the existence of correspondences between the hypothetical and the confirmative in conditional expressions and the modern interpretations of the Man’yōshū bearing on these], *Kokugo Kokubun*, April, 1952, re-issued in the collection *Man’yōshū go-hō no kenkyū* [Research on linguistic constructions in the Man’yōshū].

<sup>ii</sup> Hatano, Kanji, *Seishin-hattatsu no shinrigaku* [The psychology of mental development].

<sup>iii</sup> Kinoshita, Masatoshi, *ibid.*

<sup>iv</sup> Ohno, Susumu, *Man’yō jidai no on’in* [Phonology of the Man’yo period] (*Man’yōshū taisei, Gengo-hen* [Man’yōshū accomplishments, Language volume]).

<sup>v</sup> Consider the poem *Na ni si oweba siwite tanomamu, ominaesi. Pana no kokoro no aki pa ukutomo* ‘As you bear the name (“omina ‘woman’”), I will go out of my way to rely on you, ominaesi (*Patrinia scabiosifolia*, ‘Golden lace’), even if the autumn (*aki*, “fickleness”) of a flower’s heart is disagreeable.’ (*Gosen wakashū* [Later collection of Japanese poems], 343). In one book, the line is *na ni si owaba* ‘if you bear the name’. The expression *Na ni si opaba iza koto topamu* is a line addressed to someone on the assumption that *na ni opeba* ‘because you bear the name’ (in other words, *na ni ou kara ni wa* ‘given that you bear the name’), *kotae-u beki mono* ‘I should be able to get a reply’. In the same way, an expression like *Otoko nara yatte miro* ‘If you are a man, try doing it’ is a hypothetical expression of the meaning *otoko de aru izyoo, yareru hazu* ‘given that you are a man, you should be able to do it’.

<sup>vi</sup> See Matsuo, Sutejirō, *Kokugo-hō ronkō* [Studies on Japanese grammar].

<sup>vii</sup> With regard to *tara* ‘if, when’, there is a hypothesis that this is the irrealis form of *tari* (PRESENT CONCLUSIVE). However, reasoning from the fact that, ever since the beginning of the era of Modern Japanese, the form resulting from attaching *ba* to *tara* has already been out of currency, it is after all more plausible to see the form as deriving from *tareba*, as has been pointed out by Kōkichirō Yuzawa. The form *tara* should be considered as being a form created by the process of analogy.

<sup>viii</sup> Saeki, Umetomo, *Monono to ga to ni tsuite* [On *monono* and *ga*], In the collection *Gengo minzoku ronshū* [Essays on language and ethnic groups].

<sup>ix</sup> This is conceivably the same with regard to expressions such as *wakakereba miti yuki sirazi* ‘as (he) is young, (he) will surely not know the way’, in which the speaker is making a conjecture about the fact that *wakakereba miti yuki sirazu* ‘because (he) is young, (he) doesn’t know the way’.

<sup>x</sup> However, in his work cited above, Masatoshi Kinoshita writes that “given that time agreement obtains in the coincidental hypothetical, it is obvious that agreement should also obtain in the manifest hypothetical”. This suggests that what Kinoshita regards as the manifest hypothetical and what is analyzed in the present paper as being the generic confirmative do not necessarily match up, but that is an idea that is not easily tenable.

<sup>xi</sup> Toki, Motoki, *Nihon bunpō, bungo-hen* [Japanese grammar, Classical volume].

---

<sup>xii</sup> See Sakakura, Atsuyoshi, *Bunpō-shi ni tsuite* [On the history of grammar], (Chapter 3, Section 3, this volume).

<sup>xiii</sup> Toki, Motoki, *Nihon bunpō, bungo-hen*.

---

ORIGINAL PAPER

SAKAKURA Atsuyoshi, 1975, *Jōken Hyōgen no Hensen*, Chapter 3, Section 4, *Bunshō to hyōgen*, Kadokawa Shoten, pp. 255-273.

Translated by Stephen Wright HORN

Proofed by John H. Haig (University of Hawai‘i at Manoa)